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We explore the importance of new public firms and public equity finance for R&D and 
creative destruction in the U.S. high-tech sector.  Over 1900 new public firms enter high-tech 
manufacturing between 1970 and 2004; they are increasingly R&D intensive and rely 
extensively on public equity finance in the 1980s and 1990s.  We estimate dynamic R&D models 
and find a strong link between public equity finance and R&D for new entrants, but not 
established entrants or incumbents.  Further, recent cohorts of public entrants have a substantial 
economic impact:  by 2000, recent public entrants account for almost half of high-tech sales and 
more than half of R&D.  Variation in the availability of public equity finance has a marked 
impact on entrant R&D and the rate at which entrants take market share from incumbents.  Our 
findings identify a key channel through which public equity markets facilitate the process of 
creative destruction. 
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1.  Introduction 
What role do stock markets play in facilitating the process of creative destruction?  In this 
study, we explore the importance of public equity finance for the R&D investment of new public 
entrants in the U.S. high-tech sector and evaluate the impact these entrants have on existing 
incumbents.  Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to the economic impact of new public 
firms and their use of public equity finance, perhaps due to misleading aggregate statistics 
suggesting that the stock market is not an important source of finance in the U.S. economy.  In 
fact, the entry of new public firms and the use of public equity finance, although highly volatile, 
increased tremendously in the 1980s and 1990s.  Furthermore, access to public equity may be 
essential for most young high-tech firms, who typically have limited access to debt and small or 
negative internal finance.    
 We focus on public entry between 1970 and 2004 in six of the largest SIC three-digit high-
tech industries in U.S. manufacturing: drugs, office and computing equipment, communications 
equipment, electronic components, industrial measuring and control instruments and medical 
instruments.  In 2000, based on value added figures, electronic components (e.g., 
semiconductors) was the largest U.S. manufacturing industry, drugs was third, instruments was 
fifth and communications equipment was sixth.  NSF figures show that in 2000 the six high-tech 
industries accounted for around 47% of manufacturing R&D and almost 30% of the total R&D 
of all firms in the U.S. economy.  More importantly for our study, between 1970 and 2004, initial 
public offerings created over 1900 newly public firms in these six industries.      
Our first objective is to explore the importance of public equity finance for new entrant 
R&D, the main investment for high-tech firms and the pivotal investment for creative 
destruction.  We use GMM to estimate dynamic R&D models that include measures of internal 
and external finance.  A large literature examines the link between internal finance and physical 
investment, but comparatively few studies consider R&D and even fewer evaluate the role of 
external finance.  We are aware of no studies that focus on the link between R&D and external 
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finance for firms immediately following their IPO, a crucial time in the firm’s life-cycle when 
investment opportunities are likely high relative to internal funds.  For the full sample of new 
public entrants between 1970 and 2004, we find a strong positive link between public stock 
issues and R&D when entrants are relatively new (first fifteen years following the IPO), but no 
link between internal or external finance and R&D for established entrants or incumbents, 
consistent with these firms having ample internal finance.  In addition, we find a stronger link 
between stock issues and new entrant R&D in more recent entry cohorts, consistent with the 
rising importance of public equity in recent years (e.g., Brown and Petersen, 2009).  Finally, the 
recent Nasdaq “bubble period” (e.g., Bradley et al., 2008) generated a remarkable boom and bust 
in the availability of public equity in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  We re-estimate the model 
for narrow periods encompassing this volatility (e.g., 1998-2002) and continue to find a strong 
link between public equity finance and new entrant R&D.  We also find that the dramatic swings 
in equity finance availability during this period are accompanied by a corresponding boom and 
bust in R&D for new entrants but not established entrants or incumbents.  Together, these results 
suggest that the availability of public equity finance has a substantial impact on the R&D of 
public entrants in the years immediately following their IPO.   
The second objective is to explore the importance of public entrants for “creative 
destruction.”  While there are several studies of the long-run financial performance of IPOs (e.g., 
Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Gompers and Lerner, 2003), we are aware of no other 
studies that examine the long-run economic impact of new public firms.  We divide the sample 
into seven five-year entry cohorts and present evidence on each cohort’s impact over time.  We 
find that rates of R&D investment for entrants are much greater than those of surviving 
incumbents, and R&D intensity rises rapidly over time with each successive entry cohort.  In 
addition, in five of the six industries, incumbents lose most of their market share of sales and 
R&D.  We also find substantial differences in economic impact across the seven entry cohorts, 
which is consistent with the dramatic variation in IPO numbers and use of public equity finance 
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over time.  We show that cohorts of IPOs that enter during periods of depressed stock prices 
(e.g., 1975-1979, 2000-2004) have comparatively small economic impact, while the four entry 
cohorts in the 1980s and 1990s each have substantial economic impact.  We also report 
regressions indicating a strong link between a cohort’s share of sales and R&D and its use of 
public equity finance.  Finally, we show that a substantial number of individual entrants make 
very heavy use of public equity and quickly become leading firms, overtaking many of the 
largest incumbents.  Finally, the aggregate impact of public entrants in the six industries is large: 
by 2000, entrants cumulatively account for approximately 29% of the total public-firm R&D in 
manufacturing and 24% of the R&D in the entire economy.     
Our findings have several implications, discussed in more detail at the end of the study.  
First, our findings are relevant for the long-standing debate on the role of the stock market for 
corporate investments (e.g., Morck et al., 1990; Baker et al. (BSW), 2003).  Second, our findings 
suggest that stock market crashes (e.g., 1974-1975, 2001-2002) and the associated declines in 
equity availability can lead to a sharp decline in innovative effort by equity-dependent firms and 
a stagnation of the process of creative destruction.  This finding has obvious implications for the 
2008-2009 crash in stock prices, which was accompanied by the near disappearance of IPOs and 
follow-up stock issues for young, high-tech firms.  Third, given the central role that R&D and 
creative destruction play in modern theories of economic growth (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 
1998), our findings provide new micro-level evidence useful for understanding the strong 
connection between financial market development and economic growth widely documented at 
the macro level (e.g., Beck and Levine, 2004).  Finally, while we have documented a dramatic 
episode of creative destruction, our findings differ in important respects from Schumpeter’s 
(1942) description of creative destruction.  Schumpeter (1942) emphasized that large established 
firms, relying on internal finance, are the primary force of innovation and creative destruction.  
In contrast, our study shows that in recent decades thousands of public entrants, relying heavily 
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on external public equity finance, are the primary source of creative destruction in the high-tech 
sector.     
2.  Background 
2.1.  High-tech manufacturing industries 
Autos, steel, and to a lesser extent airplanes and petroleum refining were the leading 
manufacturing industries for much of the 20
th
 century, and a small number of original 
incumbents (e.g., GM and Boeing) dominated these industries for most of this period.  In the 
second half of the 20
th
 century, a new group of high-tech manufacturing industries emerged: 
drugs (SIC 283), office and computing equipment (SIC 357), communications equipment (SIC 
366), electronic components (SIC 367), measuring and control instruments (SIC 382) and 
medical instruments (SIC 384).  These are the leading manufacturing industries listed in the U.S. 
Department of Commerce classification of high technology.
1
  With one exception, the six 
industries appear in the Census back to at least 1947, but account for only 7.4% of manufacturing 
value added in 1970.  By 2000, however, value added for the six industries is 18.9%, higher than 
the peak share of autos, steel, aircraft and petroleum refining.  In 2000, based on industry sales 
and using information from the new NAICS (four-digit) classification system, electronic 
components is the largest manufacturing industry, drugs is third, instruments is fifth and 
communications equipment is sixth.
2
             
In 1970, there are several large established incumbents in all six of the high-tech industries.   
For example, in the computer industry, IBM is the leading firm but there are several other major 
                                                 
1
 United States Department of Commerce, “An Assessment of United States Competitiveness in High-Technology 
Industries,” February, 1983.  We do not consider the aerospace industry (in SIC 37), a high-tech industry in which 
the government supplies much of the R&D financing. There are no other large high-tech industries in SIC 28, 35, 36 
or 38, and SICs 366, 367, 382 and 384 make up the bulk of the sales of their respective two-digit industries. 
2
 Starting in 1997, the U.S. Census of Manufacturing is based on the NAICS classification system.  Most of the 
industries have a close counterpart to the old SIC classification system.  Drugs, computers, communications 
equipment, and electronic components are all separate NAICS industries.  The two instrument industries are 
combined into a single industry (3345).  Using the mapping of 4-digit SIC industries into 5-digit NAICS industries, 
we computed the valued added for the constituent parts of  SIC 382 and SIC 384 that now appear in NAICS 3345.  
Based on these numbers, old SIC 382 plus old SIC 384 would be the 5th largest industry in 2000.  These figures are 
also used to compute the 18.9% value added figure for the year 2000. 
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corporations active in the industry, including General Electric, RCA, Honeywell, DEC and 
Control Data.  In the 1990s, U.S. world market share rises in most of these industries, and by 
2000 the U.S. is the leading producer of drugs, communications equipment, office and 
computing equipment, semiconductors, and medical and scientific instruments.   
2.2.  The role of public equity finance 
Public firms account for the vast majority of R&D and output in the U.S. high-tech sector 
and there are almost no major private high-tech firms.  A plausible reason is that the external 
capital supplied by public equity markets is crucial for the development of young high-tech firms 
given their limited access to other sources of finance.  Internal equity finance is no doubt less 
costly than public equity, but internal cash flow is typically small and often negative for young 
high-tech firms.  Debt finance has several disadvantages compared to equity finance for high-
tech firms:  i) debt accentuates problems of financial distress, ii) the nature of the debt contract is 
poorly suited for the uncertainty and skewness of returns associated with high-tech investment, 
and iii) R&D has very limited collateral value that should greatly restrict the use of debt, since 
risky firms typically must pledge collateral to obtain debt finance (Berger and Udell, 1990).  
While venture capital has emerged as an important source of early-stage financing, and may 
often be essential if a start-up firm is to reach the point of going public, it is designed to last for a 
relatively brief period (e.g., 3 to 4 years), and VC injections are typically small compared to 
public equity finance (see, for example, Table 8).    
This discussion suggests a potentially important role for public equity finance in the 
financing of high-tech investment.  Fama and French (2004, p. 229) state that becoming a public 
firm is “the point of entry that gives firms expanded access to equity capital, allowing them to 
emerge and grow.”  Nevertheless, stock issues are typically viewed as unimportant as a source of 
finance.  One reason is misleading aggregate statistics showing that net external equity issues are 
small in the U.S. economy.  Because large firms often use stock buybacks as a way to distribute 
earnings to shareholders, aggregate net new equity figures (which include buybacks) are often 
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small and can be negative (see Brealey and Myers, 2000, Table 14.1).  Looking only at the 
aggregate net equity figure, however, obscures the fact that many firms early in their life-cycle 
make extensive use of stock issues, as we show later in the paper.  Over the last three decades, 
there has been a sharp upward trend in the issuance of stock, particularly for young firms listed 
on the Nasdaq.
3
  The creation of the Nasdaq (1971) and the National Marketing System (1980s) 
are major improvements in public equity markets, particularly for the entrants in our sample, 
who typically have no other choice given the listing requirements of the NYSE and AMEX (see 
the discussion in Brown and Petersen, 2009).     
We summarize the financing of young high-tech firms as follows:  internal finance is 
typically small and often negative, debt is essentially unavailable, and VC financing is limited in 
scope, suggesting that public equity is the key marginal source of finance.  If firms have no close 
substitute for public equity finance, there are a number of testable predictions, including:  i) the 
availability of public finance should impact the R&D investment of new entrants, but ii) equity 
finance should not matter for incumbents and established entrants who typically have sufficient 
internal funds.  A related prediction is that booms and busts in the availability of equity will lead 
to corresponding fluctuations in R&D investment for recent entrants but not established firms.  
Finally, the availability of public equity should impact the rate at which entrants innovate and 
grow, and hence the speed and extent of creative destruction. 
2.3.  Related literature   
The findings in a number of papers suggest the potential for stock markets to play an 
important role for new firms seeking to challenge established incumbents.  For example, Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) show that financial development is particularly beneficial to the creation of 
new firms. They also provide evidence of a life-cycle in the pattern of financing for U.S. 
manufacturing firms: firms rely very heavily on public equity finance in the decade following the 
                                                 
3
 Jay Ritter (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/seoall.html) identifies 1082 seasoned offerings in the 1970s, 2468 offerings 
in the 1980s, and 4867 offerings in the 1990s. 
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IPO, but this reliance fades over time.  BSW (2003) label firms as “equity dependent” if they 
need external equity to finance marginal investments and they show that stock prices have a 
stronger impact on the investment of these firms.  A growing empirical literature finds that 
measures of the degree of stock market development are positively correlated with economic 
growth (see Levine (2005) for a survey).  In particular, Beck and Levine (2004) find that stock 
market development has an economically large impact on growth, and Wurgler (2000) and Pang 
and Wu (2008) find that countries with better developed financial markets (including stock 
markets) are better at reallocating capital from declining sectors to growing industries.   
Perhaps the most important channel through which stock markets can foster the process 
of creative destruction is the financing of R&D.  Yet compared to the large empirical literature 
examining the financing of physical investment, relatively few studies explore the financing of 
R&D (see Hall (2002) for a review of this literature).  Furthermore, only a couple of these 
studies consider the role of external equity finance for R&D.  Muller and Zimmerman (2008) 
show that for small- and medium-sized private German companies, higher equity-to-assets ratios 
are associated with higher R&D intensity.  Brown et al. (BFP, 2009) explore whether 
fluctuations in the supply of internal and external equity finance can explain the U.S. aggregate 
R&D boom in the 1990s.  They examine only the 1990 to 2004 period and, more importantly, 
they do not consider the financing of firms with persistent negative cash flows, which excludes a 
large fraction of newly public entrants from their study.  Brown and Petersen (2009) study the 
implications of rising R&D and increasing use of external equity for investment-cash flow 
sensitivities, but they do not focus on public entrants nor do they examine the behavior of R&D 
during the equity finance boom/bust of 1998-2002.  Our methodology also differs significantly 
from Brown and Petersen (2009):  we use a structural Euler equation to model the dynamics of 
R&D investment, and we estimate the model with a systems GMM estimator that has been 
shown to improve on the finite-sample bias and asymptotic imprecision of the “difference” 
GMM estimator used in both BFP (2009) and Brown and Petersen (2009).  Most importantly, 
8 
 
none of these studies evaluate the economic impact of public entry or consider the role that 
public equity availability plays in the process of creative destruction. 
3.  IPOs over time and across industries 
3.1.  The data 
We focus on initial public offerings in U.S. manufacturing between 1970 and 2004.  Our 
primary source for the year and dollar size of IPOs is Thompson Financial’s SDC New Issues 
database.  We then match this list of IPOs to the publicly traded firms in Compustat, which 
reports information (e.g., finance and R&D) typically not available to the researcher in other 
entry studies.  Compustat has coverage for approximately 93% of the IPO firms identified in the 
SDC database.  We only include firms if Compustat reports a primary SIC code within 
manufacturing (SIC 2000-3999) and a U.S. incorporation code.  We do not include spin-offs or 
carve-outs in the set of IPOs, nor do we include mergers that create a new firm.  While the 
number of spin-offs is not large, some large firms have been created through spin-offs in recent 
years:  for example, AT&T spun off Lucent Technologies in 1996, and Hewlett Packard spun off 
Agilent in 1999.  Since these firms are ex-divisions of major incumbents we treat them 
separately from the “public entrants” throughout the study.  The final dataset contains 3596 
newly public firms.
4
     
For all of the results, we examine the high-tech industries separately, and only pool the six 
industries if there are no outlier industries.  For some issues that we believe are of secondary 
importance, we briefly summarize the findings but do not report the results in a table.  In all such 
cases, tables are available on request.  We typically provide information on different cohorts of 
                                                 
4
 An additional 187 firms went public in a non-manufacturing sector, but at some point in their lives were primarily 
manufacturing firms.  We do not include them in the initial count of IPOs, but we do allow them to enter our data in 
the years they were primarily in manufacturing.  Similarly, firms entering in a manufacturing industry and 
subsequently leaving are dropped once the primary SIC code reported by Compustat is outside of manufacturing. 
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entrants, similar to the approach in Dunne et al., 1988).  In most cases we divide the entrants into 
seven five-year cohorts, beginning with 1970-1974 and ending with 2000-2004.    
3.2.  IPOs by three-digit industry 
Table 1 reports the breakdown of IPOs for the six high-tech industries in our study.  The 
last two rows report the total number of high-tech IPOs and their share of all manufacturing IPOs 
for a given time period.  At the start of 1970 there are a large number of publicly traded 
incumbents in the six high-tech industries (254), accounting for 14% of all public manufacturing 
firms.  There are 254 IPOs in the 1970-1974 cohort but only 42 IPOs between 1975 and 1979, 
following the 1974-75 crash (and subsequent stagnation) in stock prices.  Following the recovery 
of stock prices, high-tech IPOs explode in the 1980s (627) and the 1990s (869).  High-tech IPO 
numbers, however, fall sharply in the 2000-2004 period (261), following the crash in Nasdaq 
prices in 2001-2002.  (Most of the IPOs in 2000-2004 occur in 2000 prior to the Nasdaq bust.)  
The second to the last column shows that there are 1931 IPOs in the six high-tech industries 
between 1970 and 2004, which account for 54% of manufacturing IPOs during the 35 year 
period.  This is a remarkable share, as there are more than 130 three-digit SIC industries in U.S. 
manufacturing.  The final column reports that at the end of 2004, the six high-tech industries 
contain 1532 surviving public firms, or 48% of the publicly traded firms in manufacturing.
5
  
Because of the pattern of IPOs in the 1980s and 1990s, nearly one-half of public firms in 
manufacturing are now concentrated in just a few industries.  
3.3.  Characteristics of the IPO 
We briefly summarize the key characteristics of the public entrants in our sample at the 
time of the IPO.  Firms are typically very young at the time they go public, with a median age of 
                                                 
5
 While not reported in the table, of the 1532 firms in existence in 2004, 59 are surviving incumbents, 1034 are 
surviving IPOs from the period 1970-2004, and 439 are “other” firms, which are new public firms in Compustat not 
identified as IPOs.  These firms include spinoffs and best effort offerings and are described at the start of section six.  
“Other” firms generally account for only a small share of economic activity.   
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around six years in both the 1980s and 1990s.
6
  Firms are generally small at the time of the IPO, 
with a median employment of around 80 workers.  Firms use almost no debt, with a median 
leverage ratio of close to zero at the time of the IPO during the 1990s and 2000s.  Finally, the 
size of IPO proceeds increases sharply over time: the median IPO rises from $6.36 million (in 
2000 dollars) for the 1970-74 cohort to $27.57 million for the 1995-1999 cohort, highlighting 
increasing importance of the first infusion of public equity.  
4.   Public equity finance and R&D 
We begin our exploration of the role of public equity with information on its relative 
importance as a source of finance.  We then provide regression results for an R&D investment 
model augmented with key sources of finance.  We conclude by examining entrant and 
incumbent R&D during the recent Nasdaq bubble.                     
4.1.  Investment and financing after the IPO 
Table 2 reports information on post-IPO investment and financing for three different 
groups of IPOs:  1970-1979, 1980-1989 and 1990-2004.  For each group, we provide separate 
information for the first two five-year intervals following the IPO (t=1 to t=5 and t=6 to t=10).  
The goal is to provide facts on the relative importance of public equity finance as a source of 
funds immediately after the IPO, and to explore how the role of equity finance for public entrants 
changes over time.  All investment and financing variables in Table 2 are cumulative:  we sum 
the annual values over the respective five-year periods and scale by beginning of period firm 
assets.  The mean values are Winsorized at the 1% level to avoid undue influence of extreme 
values.  Since we sum over each five-year period, we report numbers only for firms that survive 
all five years of the particular interval in question.
7
  To measure internal equity finance we add 
                                                 
6
 Most of the age data is graciously provided by Laura Field and Jay Ritter (see Field and Karpoff, 2002 and 
Loughran and Ritter, 2004).   
7
 Note that this restriction means that the results for the t=6 to t=10 period for the final entry cohorts include only 
entrants between 1990 and 1994 that survived to t=10.  
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R&D investment to the firm’s reported cash flow because R&D is treated as an expense and we 
want a measure of internal equity finance gross of all investment expenditures (e.g., Himmelberg 
and Petersen, 1994). 
The R&D ratios over the first five-year period following the IPO rise sharply across the 
periods; for example, the median ratio increases from 0.23 for the 1970s IPOs to 1.01 for the 
1990-2004 IPOs (the pattern for the means is similar).  The physical investment ratios are similar 
to the R&D ratios for the 1970s IPOs, but the physical investment ratios do not rise across 
periods, and therefore the final cohorts of high-tech public entrants do far more R&D than 
physical investment.  The medians for total investment (R&D plus physical investment) rise 
sharply over time due entirely to the rise in R&D.  The median values of cumulative new total 
debt are near zero, while the means of debt are modest compared to the mean of total investment.  
Cumulative gross cash flows are comparatively large in the first set of IPOs, but fall substantially 
in the final set and are only a small fraction of total investment.  The importance of stock issues 
as a source of funds increases substantially across the entry cohorts.  While median cumulative 
stock issues are modest for the 1970s and 1980s IPO cohorts, the mean value for stock issues in 
each of the first five-year intervals is roughly the same as cash flow.  By the final set of IPOs 
(1990-2004), median stock issues are considerably larger than median cash flow and mean stock 
issues are many times larger than cash flow in both five-year intervals following the IPO.  The 
last two rows show that gross cash flow is frequently negative and high-tech firms rarely pay 
dividends.   Furthermore, the fraction of gross cash flow observations that are negative rises 
steeply over time:  the share of negative cash flow observations during the first five-year interval 
increases from 0.11 for 1970-1979 entrants to 0.41 for 1990-2004 entrants.  This increase in the 
frequency of negative cash flows is consistent with the sharp decline in median and mean cash 
flows for the final group of entrants.   
The numbers in Table 2 show that the importance of public equity as a source of finance 
for newly public high-tech firms grows dramatically over time, from relatively modest figures in 
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the 1970s to very large values (compared to cash flow or total investment) by the 1990s.  Given 
that debt finance is typically small, the numbers suggest that by the 1980s, public equity finance 
is the main external form of finance and presumably the key marginal form of finance for newly 
public high-tech firms.  Indeed, the financial features of high-tech entrants we document in Table 
2 (e.g., negative cash flows, low incremental debt capacity) match the characteristics of firms 
that BSW (2003) identify as “equity-dependent.”  Thus, we expect that for the high-tech cohorts 
of the 1980s, and especially for the cohorts of the 1990s, variation in access to public equity 
finance will be an important determinant of firm-level investment in R&D. 
4.2.  R&D model  
We formally examine the link between R&D and public stock issues with a dynamic 
investment model developed by Bond and Meghir (1994) to study the role of financial effects for 
physical investment.  Bond and Meghir (1994) derive an Euler equation for optimal capital 
accumulation with adjustment costs for imperfectly competitive firms.  Bond and Meghir (1994) 
focus on fixed investment, but an analogous estimating equation based on the Euler condition 
can be derived for R&D (also see BFP, 2009).  One complication is that the stock of R&D (the 
analog of the stock of fixed capital used in investment studies) is not reported by the firm and 
can only be crudely approximated; we therefore scale all regression variables by the book value 
of total assets, which follows the approach in a number of other studies (e.g., BSW, 2003; BFP, 
2009).  To examine the link between R&D and public equity finance we add current period and 
lagged new share issues to the baseline Euler specification.  We also add current period cash 
flow to examine and control for internal equity finance and contemporaneous sales as an 
additional control for demand.  With these modifications, the estimating equation is: 
 
         
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where RD is research and development spending for firm j in period t, TA is the beginning-of-
period stock of firm assets,  SALES is firm revenue, B is the stock of firm debt, GCF denotes 
gross cash flow and STK is net funds raised from new share issues.  The variable dit is a time-
specific effect defined at the industry level, i, which controls for industry-specific changes in 
technological opportunities over time that could affect the firm-level demand for R&D.  The 
variable αj is a firm-specific effect that captures firm-level differences in technology, managerial 
quality, and a variety of other time-invariant factors that may impact R&D.  The parameters in 
equation (1) can be interpreted as functions of the structural parameters of the original 
optimization problem presented in Bond and Meghir (1994).
8
   
We obtain consistent estimates of equation (1) with a system GMM estimator that jointly 
estimates a regression of equation (1) in differences with the regression in levels (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).  This method uses lagged levels as instruments for the 
regression in differences and lagged differences as instruments for the regression in levels, and 
can improve on the finite-sample bias and asymptotic imprecision of the difference GMM 
estimator used in other recent studies that estimate dynamic R&D models (e.g., BFP, 2009; 
Brown and Petersen, 2009).  We treat all right-hand side variables as potentially endogenous and 
use lagged levels dated t-2 to t-4 as instruments for the regression in differences, and lagged 
differences dated t-1 for the regression in levels.  Despite excluding lags beyond t-4 from the 
instrument set, the estimation approach we use generates a relatively large number of instruments 
compared to the number of firms in several of the different sub-samples we study.  We therefore 
“collapse” the instrument matrix as discussed in Roodman (2009).9  To assess instrument validity 
                                                 
8
 The structural model predicts a positive coefficient on lagged R&D and a negative coefficient on the squared term.  
The magnitude of the coefficients will depend on discount and depreciation rates, but both coefficients should 
slightly exceed one in absolute value.  The lagged sales-to-asset ratio has a positive coefficient under imperfect 
competition that goes to zero as the elasticity of demand faced by the firm approaches the competitive value.  The 
lagged debt-assets ratio allows for bankruptcy costs and a tax advantage to debt.  The lagged gross cash flow-asset 
ratio appears in the specification without financing constraints, but it has a negative sign.   
9
 Our findings are robust to alternative lags for the instruments, including beginning the instruments at t-3 (instead of 
t-2) and extending the lags to either t-5 or t-6.  In addition, if we do not collapse the instrument set there are no 
qualitative changes in our findings. 
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we report a Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions and an m2 test for second-order 
autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, which, if present, can render the GMM 
estimator inconsistent.  We also report a difference-in-Hansen test that evaluates the validity of 
the additional instruments required for systems estimation (i.e., the instruments used in the levels 
equation).  These tests indicate no problems with instrument validity or specification.  Finally, 
we report chi-squared tests that the sum of the financial variables is significantly different from 
zero.  We trim the upper and lower tails of all regression variables at the 1% level.  
4.3.  Results by firm type and entry cohort  
In Table 3 we report regression results for both new public entrants and existing 
incumbents.  Incumbents likely do not face binding financing constraints and we therefore expect 
small or zero coefficients on all financial variables.  In contrast, based on the arguments in 
Section 2 and the figures in Table 2, entrants are likely dependent, at the margin, on external 
equity for a period of time following the IPO.  Eventually, however, dependence on stock issues 
should fade as entrants become established and capable of generating sufficient cash flow to fund 
all investment.  The figures in Rajan and Zingales (1998) suggest that most firms do not raise 
substantial sums of equity once they reach 15 years after the IPO.  We therefore divide entrants 
into two groups: we define public entrants to be “new entrants” for the first fifteen years 
following the IPO and “established entrants” thereafter.  (We also considered cutoffs at 10 and 
20 years beyond the IPO and the results are very similar.)  We expect substantial stock 
coefficients for new entrants and relatively unimportant stock coefficients for established 
entrants.  We also report separate results for the IPOs groupings reported in Table 2.  The 
increasing importance of stock issues documented in Table 2 and the substantial improvements 
in equity markets during our sample period (see the discussion in Brown and Petersen, 2009) 
suggest the potential for an increasing link between stock issues and R&D over time.   
The first three columns in Table 3 report results for the full time period: all IPOs are 
grouped together and we switch entrants to the “established” category after 15 years.  For both 
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new and established entrants, the coefficient on lagged R&D tends to be close to one (consistent 
with the underlying model), while the coefficient on lagged R&D squared is always negative, but 
somewhat smaller (in absolute value) than expected.  For established entrants and incumbents, 
coefficient estimates on both cash flow and stock issues are small and insignificant, as expected 
if they no longer face binding financing constraints.  For the new entrants, cash flow coefficients 
are also insignificant, likely due to the very large fraction of negative cash flow observations for 
these firms (e.g., Allayannis and Mozumdar, 2004; Guariglia, 2008).  Most importantly for our 
study, the coefficient estimate on contemporaneous stock issues is quantitatively large (0.229) 
and statistically significant (as is the sum of stock coefficients).    
The next three columns report results for new entrants grouped by the year of their IPO.  
The coefficients on cash flow are, once again, typically small and always insignificant.  We are 
particularly interested in the pattern of stock coefficients across the different entry cohorts.  For 
the 1970s IPOs, the contemporaneous stock coefficient is positive (0.080) but statistically 
insignificant.  For the 1980s IPOs, the contemporaneous coefficient is 0.115 (sum is 0.085) and 
the estimates are highly significant.  For the final entry cohorts (1990-2004), the 
contemporaneous coefficient is 0.263 (sum is 0.234) and the estimates are also highly significant.  
Thus, there is a substantial increase in the estimated link between stock issues and new entrant 
R&D over time. 
Overall, Table 3 indicates that that public equity has an important impact on the level of 
R&D investment by newly public high-tech entrants.  Furthermore, based on the sharp rise in the 
estimated stock coefficients, it appears that the role of the stock market for R&D investment by 
newly public firms has grown sharply over time.  This interpretation is supported by the fact that 
we find no significant link between stock issues and R&D for established entrants or incumbents, 
who should be beyond the point in their life-cycle where high-cost public equity is required to 
finance the marginal investment.     
4.4.  Further analysis: The Nasdaq “bubble”   
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A strong test of causality would be to examine the behavior of public entrant R&D during a 
time when access to public equity finance disappeared.  The closest “natural experiment” we 
have is the Nasdaq bubble period.  The Nasdaq Index jumped from 1,574 at the start of 1998 to 
4,186 by the start of 2000, briefly broke 5,000 in 2000, but began a swift decent at the end of 
2000, reaching approximately 1,100 in August 2002.  The bubble and its collapse generated a 
remarkable boom and bust in the availability and use of public equity finance, permitting 
additional tests of its importance.     
An extensive literature shows that stock-market mispricing can lower the cost of external 
equity finance and increase the availability of public equity.  For example, Morck et al. (1990) 
note that for firms facing financing constraints, overpriced equity lowers the cost of capital and 
may allow constrained firms the opportunity to issue shares and increase investment.  Loughran 
and Ritter (1995, p 46) state that their “evidence is consistent with a market where firms take 
advantage of transitory windows of opportunity by issuing equity, when, on average, they are 
substantially overvalued.”  BSW (2003) find that the investment of “equity-dependent” firms is 
especially sensitive to stock prices.    
Collectively, the public entrants we study exhibit a pronounced boom and bust in equity 
usage that lines up well with the view that firms exploited mispricing in the Nasdaq by issuing 
new shares.  Between 1998 and 2000, total public equity issues by the new high-tech entrants in 
our sample rises over 420 percent from $7.96 billion to $41.52 billion (in 2000 dollars).  
Following the collapse in the Nasdaq prices, total stock issues by new entrants falls dramatically, 
equaling $6.88 billion in 2002 before a modest recovery in 2003 and 2004.   
Given the extremely large variation in public equity issues, it is important to check whether 
our regression results hold up for narrow windows around the Nasdaq bubble.  The final 
regression in Table 3 (column seven) examines the narrow window 1998-2002, where we use 
years prior to 1998 as instruments (the findings are similar for other windows, such as 1997-
2003).  For new entrants, the sum of the estimates for current and lagged cash flow is positive 
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but small (0.063) and statistically insignificant.   In contrast, the coefficient estimates for stock 
issues is large (sum is 0.235) and statistically significant.  Thus, the stock coefficients for the 
narrow window 1998-2002 are very similar to the coefficients discussed earlier for IPOs in the 
final period.   
The large swing in equity issues, together with the quantitatively important coefficient 
estimate on stock issues, generates two predictions.  First, if the availability of public equity 
finance matters for new entrant R&D, then the extremely large variation in public equity should 
have resulted in a boom and bust in R&D investment for new entrants.  We note that large 
fluctuations in R&D are not common, as R&D is widely known to be highly persistent at both 
the firm and aggregate levels.  The second prediction is that R&D by established entrants and 
incumbent firms, who are not equity dependent, should be stable.  New entrant investment in 
R&D does in fact exhibit a boom and bust pattern.  For example, the median R&D-to-asset ratio 
among new entrants is 0.158 in 1998, only slightly below the median for the decade of the 1990s 
(0.161).  By 2000, at the peak of the Nasdaq bubble, the median ratio jumps to 0.210, a 33 
percent increase over the 1998 figure.  By 2002, the median ratio falls to 0.140, a 33 percent 
decline from the 2000 figure and well below the median ratio for the 1990s.  The average R&D 
ratios (Winsorized at the 1% level) exhibit even larger percentage changes during this period: the 
averages for 1998, 2000, and 2002 are 0.238, 0.382 and 0.226.  At both the mean and the 
median, the R&D ratio in 2000 is statistically different from the values in 1998 and 2002.
10
   
For incumbents and established entrants, on the other hand, there is no evidence of a boom 
and bust pattern.  The median R&D-to-assets ratio among incumbents actually falls between 
1998 and 2000 (0.089 to 0.073), and is largely unchanged between 2000 and 2002 (0.073 to 
0.068).  Similarly, the median R&D ratios for established entrants for 1998, 2000 and 2002 are 
relatively stable (0.101, 0.112 and 0.102). 
                                                 
10
 The z-values from Wilcoxon tests of median differences are 5.16 for 1998-2000 and -6.61 for 2000-2002.  The t-
statistic for mean differences is 7.00 for 1998 to 2000 and -7.29 for 2000 to 2002. 
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These findings provide strong evidence of a link between the supply of public equity 
finance and new entrant R&D.  The lack of an R&D boom and bust for incumbents and 
established entrants strongly suggests that sudden technological demand shocks for R&D are not 
driving our results: it seems implausible that demand shocks will impact only entrants.  Instead, 
this evidence is consistent with major supply shifts in public equity finance that enable entrants 
to sharply increase R&D in the late 1990s, but entrants are then forced to curtail R&D when 
equity finance largely disappears after 2000.  These results strengthen our overall case that 
access to public equity finance is important for the R&D investment of public entrants.  
5.  Public entrants and creative destruction 
The findings presented so far suggest the potential for recent public entrants to have a 
major impact on the high-tech sector.  In particular, our results show the creation of a very large 
number of new public firms that receive heavy funding from the stock market, and this funding 
has a substantial impact on R&D, the type of investment most relevant for creative destruction.  
The rest of the paper explores the economic impact of these new entrants.   
In the tables that follow, we trace the impact of each entry cohort over the period 1970-
2004.  We do not label entrants as “new” and “established” (which we did for purposes of testing 
for financing constraints); rather, we seek to measure the complete impact of each of the seven 
cohorts (similar to Dunne et al., 1988).  We also report results for the drug industry separately.  
The reason the drug industry is an outlier is straightforward:  drug companies in the U.S. must go 
through protracted clinical trials and often go public before completing the trials and securing 
FDA approval for their first product.  As a consequence, these firms often have little or no sales 
for many years after the IPO.    
5.1.  R&D intensity by cohort 
Table 4 reports median R&D-to-sales ratios for entry cohorts and incumbents in selected 
years.  We find no meaningful differences across the high-tech industries except for drugs, which 
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is excluded from Panel A and reported separately in Panel B.  In Panel A, moving down the 
diagonal, new cohorts are generally more R&D intensive over time, culminating with the year 
2000, where the 1995-1999 cohort has a median R&D-to-sales ratio of 0.180, three times larger 
than the median R&D ratio of the initial cohort in 1975.  This pattern is consistent with the 
regression results and the greater availability of equity finance in the 1980s and 1990s.  Moving 
along the rows, R&D ratios generally rise over time for each cohort.  It is interesting, however, 
that median R&D ratios in 2004 are lower than those in 2000 in all cohorts but one, consistent 
with the decline in equity availability in 2001-2003.  Incumbent R&D ratios also rise somewhat 
over time, but they lag well behind the R&D intensities of all entry cohorts.  The much higher 
R&D intensities of new entrants is consistent with a process of creative destruction driven by 
innovation.     
Panel B reports values for the drug industry.  We do not report figures for the first two 
cohorts because of the small number of observations.  Median R&D ratios are very high and are 
probably not especially informative given the fact that entrants often have little or no sales for 
many years after the IPO.  
5.2.  Share of sales 
Table 5 reports the share of sales accounted for by incumbents and entry cohorts over time.  
Each firm’s sales is assigned to a single three-digit industry, and then an aggregate sales figure is 
computed for the set of five high-tech industries (Panel A) and drugs (Panel B).  Diversification 
is a potential problem as the largest firms are often diversified across multiple three-digit 
industries.  However, for our application, diversification is not likely to be a significant issue, 
because when high-tech firms diversify, most of their sales are contained within the set of the 
five high-tech industries that make up Panel A of Table 5.  We do, however, have a direct way of 
checking on possible problems created by diversification.  Beginning in the late 1990s, 
Compustat regularly reports each firm’s sales disaggregated into its main four-digit SIC 
industries (business segment data).  We use these numbers to compute share of sales of entrants 
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and incumbents for 2000 and 2004.  These numbers should be very accurate and provide a check 
on our other figures.  A check of these numbers shows that they are nearly identical to those 
reported in Table 5.
11
            
For completeness, Table 5 reports the share of sales for “other” firms, who are firms that 
have no Compustat coverage prior to 1970 and are not identified as IPOs.  Fama and French 
(2004) also document a sizable number of new listings in CRSP that do not show up in their IPO 
data base, and they believe many of these firms are “best effort” offerings of firms that are 
typically very small and may not trade initially on the major exchanges.  We examine all large 
“other” firms to see if they should be reclassified as incumbents or IPO firms.  The large “other” 
firms are almost exclusively spinoffs, such as Lucent and Agilent.  As is apparent in the tables, 
“other” firms account for only a small share of economic activity in all years except 2000.12 
Starting with the high-tech firms in Panel A, there are a number of interesting findings.  
First, going down the diagonal, the cohorts entering in years with relatively depressed stock 
prices – 1970-1974, 1975-1979 and 2000-2004 – have the lowest initial market share of sales.  
The four cohorts of the 1980s and 1990s – periods of generally robust stock prices – have the 
largest initial shares of sales.  Second, moving along the rows, market shares of most cohorts rise 
over time.  This result differs from the key finding in Dunne et al. (1988) showing that new 
cohorts lose market share fairly rapidly over time.
13
  Third, and most importantly, incumbents 
lose a great deal of market share to new public entrants.  By 2000, entrants account for almost 
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 Since segment sales are reported at the four-digit level, we aggregate across four-digit industries to compute a 
segmented sales figure for each firm at the three-digit level.  If segmented data was missing for a firm, we used the 
firm level sales figure reported on the Compustat’s Industrial Annual database and placed the entire amount in the 
firm’s primary industry (this was seldom necessary). Using sales figures from this segmented data base, IPO cohort 
shares in 2000 are virtually identical (e.g., starting with the 1970-1974 cohort, the shares are 0.072, 0.009, 0.114, 
0.132, 0.100 and 0.057), while  incumbent’s share of sales falls to 37% and “other” firms share increases slightly (to 
0.146).  
12
 The market share of “other” firms is small until 2000, where three large spinoffs drive the share to nearly 13%. 
Spinoffs Lucent, Agilent and Avaya accounted for almost 60% of the total sales in the “others” category in 2000.   
13
 The explanation for the difference is likely due to multiple factors, including the fact that high-tech public entrants 
had high survival rates and very high real growth rates in the last two decades.  In addition, the Dunne et al. (1988) 
study covers the time period 1963 to 1982, and our study shows that the impact of new public entrants is fairly small 
in the 1970s, even for high-tech industries.     
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48% of high-tech sales, while incumbent market share is just 38.6% (37.0% using business 
segment data).
14
  Incumbent loss of market share is largest in the 1990s, the period of greatest 
availability of public equity, and most of this market share goes to the four entry cohorts of the 
1980s and 1990s.  By 2004, however, incumbents experience a modest rebound in their market 
share.
15
  This temporary stabilization of market share of incumbents stands in contrast to the 
sharp loss of market share in the 1990s and suggests that the decline in the availability of public 
equity after 2000 greatly slowed the process of creative destruction by sharply curtailing R&D 
investment, the entry of new firms, and the expansion of previous entry cohorts.   
Panel B explores the drug industry, which has over four hundred public entrants, 
concentrated heavily in 1990s.  Yet as of 2004, incumbents have a market share just under eighty 
percent.  We believe the main reasons are the length of clinical trials and the fact that most entry 
was relatively recent.   
To briefly explore the association between incumbent loss of market share and public 
equity, we run simple descriptive regressions relating the evolution of cohort and firm shares of 
sales to sources of finance.  The data points for the cohort level regressions are the share of sales 
figures (at five-year intervals) as shown in Panel A of Table 5.  Let j stand for the cohort or firm 
and t represent a particular period (e.g., 1975, 1980, etc.).  The left-hand side variable is 
∆SALESjt, which is the change in share of sales between period t and t-1 for cohort or firm j, 
while the right-hand side variables are the flows of finance (CASHFLOWjt, STOCKjt, and 
DEBTjt) raised by the cohort or firm in the corresponding five-year period.  Table 7 reports the 
regression results for the five high-tech industries.  Panel A shows that at the cohort level only 
public equity issues are positively (and significant at the 6% level) associated with ∆SALESjt.  
                                                 
14 For Tables 5 and 6, we leave IBM in industry SIC 357 through 2000, even though IBM’s primary SIC code 
changes to 737 (which is outside of manufacturing) in 1998.  Because IBM is a very large incumbent, allowing IBM 
to switch would significantly increase the reported market shares of IPO firms.   
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 Much of the rebound is the acquisition of Compaq (of the cohort 1980-1984) by Hewlett-Packard in 2002.  When 
we recompute the numbers without this acquisition, the incumbent’s share of sales in 2004 is virtually unchanged 




This is consistent with the fact that the cohorts in the 1980s and 1990s have the sharpest gains in 
share of sales as well as the largest IPOs and the heaviest use of follow-up equity.  At the firm 
level (Panel B) all sources of finance are positively associated with ∆SALESjt, though the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimate on stock issues is more than twice as large as the 
coefficient on new debt and almost twenty times larger than the coefficient on cash flow.   
5.3.  Share of R&D 
Table 6 reports the shares of R&D for the entry cohorts and the incumbents over time.  The 
findings in Table 6 are similar to those in Table 5.  First, in Panel A, the three cohorts from 
periods with depressed stock prices (1970s and 2000-2004) have substantially lower shares of 
R&D than the cohorts of the 1980s and 1990s.  Second, cohort shares of R&D tend to rise over 
time.  Third, by 2000, new public entrants’ share of R&D is 51.8% and incumbent’s share is only 
32%, less than their share of sales.  Most of the incumbent’s loss of R&D share occurs in the 
1990s and no loss occurs in the period 2000-2004, consistent with Table 5.  Panel B is also 
broadly consistent with the findings in the corresponding panel in Table 5, though public entrants 
in the drug industry account for a larger share of R&D than sales by the end of the sample 
period.  
We run a descriptive regression exploring the link between sources of finance and changes 
in the share of R&D identical to the regressions for ∆SALESjt discussed above.  The data points 
for the cohort level regressions are now the share of R&D figures as shown in Panel A of Table 
6.  The regression results are reported in the second column of Table 7.  Once again, the results 
show that only public equity issues are positively associated (and statistically significant) with 
∆R&Djt at the cohort level, and while both cash flow and stock issues are positively associated 
with ∆R&Djt at the firm level, the coefficient estimate on stock issues is more than fifteen times 
larger.  A comparison of the estimated coefficients for stock issues across the two columns in 
Table 7 indicates a stronger relationship between share of R&D and public equity than between 
share of sales and public equity, consistent with the equity-dependent nature of R&D.  While the 
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findings in Table 7 are only descriptive regressions, they support our argument that public equity 
finance played a significant role in the process of creative destruction in the high-tech sector.   
5.4.  Leading firms and public equity usage 
It is possible that the sheer volume of entry caused a substantial amount of creative 
destruction without any individual entrant ever becoming a leading firm.  We thus briefly 
consider whether a significant number of individual high-tech public entrants displaced 
incumbents as leading producers.  In Table 8 we present detailed information for the top ten 
firms in 2000 (based on sales) in two of the largest and most important industries: office and 
computing equipment (Panel A) and electronic components (Panel B).   
In Panel A, by 2000, new public entrants, mostly founded in the 1980s, have displaced 
most of the original leading incumbents in office and computing equipment.  While incumbents 
Hewlett-Packard and IBM have the largest sales, Compaq and Dell are close behind.
16
  With the 
exception of Xerox, the rest of the leading firms in office and computing equipment – Cisco, Sun 
Microsystems, Gateway, EMC, and Apple – are all new public entrants.  Five of the seven 
entrants receive significant VC financing.  Most of the IPOs are large, with four over $90 
million.  Most entrants make heavy use of follow-up equity financing, with Cisco raising nearly 
$2.82 billion and Compaq raising $1.16 billion.
17
 
Electronic components (Panel B) is an even better example of an industry where entrants 
rapidly displaced the leading incumbents.  By 2000, Intel and Solectron are the two leading 
firms, ahead of Texas Instruments and Motorola (also semiconductor producers), the leading 
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 By 2003, Dell has the world’s largest market share (approximately 15%) of personal computers despite Hewlett-
Packard’s purchase of Compaq in 2002 (Wall Street Journal, 5/12/2004). 
17
 We recognize the life-cycle feature of new equity financing and measure the magnitude of new equity financing 
in the period of a firm’s life-cycle when it is a net seller of equity.  To do this we sum net new equity finance until 
we reach a year in which the firm is a net buyer of equity (i.e., until net new share issues are negative).  We then 
compare this value to the value generated by summing net equity finance over all years following the IPO (or, for 
incumbents, all the years between 1970 and 2000).  We report the larger of the two values in Table 8.  Stopping at 
the first time the firm is a net buyer of equity has the potential to greatly understate the firm’s use of equity finance, 
as firms may have a year or more when both sales and purchases of equity are quite small, resulting in a small 
negative values for net new share issues.  All financing figures are expressed in 2000 dollars. 
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firms of the late 1960s and 1970s.  Five of the six entrants received venture capital.  All six 
entrants make heavy use of follow-up public equity, with four firms raising over $1 billion.  In 
addition to the two industries shown in Table 8, many new public entrants are also leading firms 
in the other four high-tech industries. 
6.  Implications: The stock market and creative destruction  
There is a long standing interest in the connection between the stock market and corporate 
investment.  Most of this interest focuses on whether stock prices influence corporate investment 
in fixed capital.  Some early, well-known studies such as Morck et al. (1990) and Blanchard et 
al. (1993) conclude that the stock market plays only a limited role in investment decisions.
18
  
More recently, BSW (2003) rank U.S. firms according to “equity dependence” and find that the 
investment of equity-dependent firms is more sensitive to Tobin’s Q, supporting the existence of 
an “equity finance channel.”  While our approach differs from these studies – we focus on stock 
issues rather than stock prices – our results support the importance of an equity finance channel 
for new public entrants.   
Another implication of our study is that public equity markets and public entrants are 
important inputs for, and agents of, creative destruction.  While our findings are in most ways an 
excellent example of Schumpeter’s (1942) perspective on competition as a “process of creative 
destruction,” there are two major differences.  Schumpeter (1942) envisioned entrants to be large 
established firms with the deep pockets needed to finance innovation and argued (p. 101) that 
large-scale establishments “not only arise in the process of creative destruction, but in many 
cases of decisive importance they provide the necessary form for that achievement.”  He (1942, 
p. 106) describes the large established firm as “the most powerful engine of economic progress” 
and he is generally pessimistic about the ability of markets made up of small firms to be 
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 Similarly, Wang et al. (2009) report that firm investment in China does not significantly respond to stock prices; 




innovative.  This view, however, differs from Schumpeter (1912), where he argues that 
entrepreneurs in the form of new firms embodying new innovative ideas are the key instruments 
of creative destruction.  Thus, while our findings that new public entrants are the main agents of 
creative destruction in the U.S. high-tech sector differ from Schumpeter (1942), they are more 
consistent with the early (and less widely appreciated) views of Schumpeter on creative 
destruction.
19
  In addition, our findings suggest that recent entrants rely extensively on external 
equity to finance innovation, which runs strongly counter to the views expressed in Schumpeter 
(1942) on the on the need for self-finance. 
Our findings also suggest that the state of development of a country’s equity markets may 
play an important role in determining the quantity and quality of a country’s public entrants, and 
therefore the performance of its high-tech sector.
20
  A plausible explanation for part of the recent 
low rate of firm formation in France, Germany and Italy is past problems in equity markets.  In 
Europe there is much public policy discussion concerning both the low numbers of high-tech 
public entrants and the lack of VC and follow-up equity financing.
21
  This lack of finance may 
explain why Germany, France and Italy have comparatively few public entrants in the last two 
decades and lag far behind the U.S. in high-tech production in the 1980s and 1990s.
22
  
Underdeveloped equity markets, accompanied by a lack of new entrants, may also have a 
significant impact on a country’s rate of economic growth.  Several studies, summarized in 
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 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the different views expressed in Schumpeter (1912).  See 
Bertocco (2008) for more discussion on Schumpeter’s views about financial development and innovation.   
20
 Undeveloped stock markets will likely also retard the R&D activity of new entrants.  For example, Ughetto (2009) 
shows that small Italian firms rely almost exclusively on internal finance for funding R&D; even though Italy is a 
bank-based system, banks in Italy appear unwilling to supply financing for R&D.      
21
 See, for example, the European Commission (1998) and Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) for a review of venture 
capital in Europe as well as a summary of the European Commission’s conclusions on lack of private and public 
equity.  Furthermore, follow-up equity financing for small high-tech firms is much lower in Europe compared to the 
U.S. (European Commission, 1998).     
22
 According to Loughran et al. (1994, updated in 2004 at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/Int.pdf), for the entire 
economy, France had 571 IPOs between 1983-2000, Germany had 407 between 1978-1999 and Italy 181 between 
1985-2001.  This contrasts with the more than 6600 IPOs in the U.S. economy between 1980-2000 (SDC New 
Issues Data Base).  In the period 1980-1998, Germany, France and Italy experienced declines of between 33% and 
41% in high-tech world market shares (The National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators, 2002, 




Aghion and Howitt (2006), advance a “Schumpeterian Paradigm” of economic growth 
characterized by creative destruction through the entry of new innovators and the exit of former 
innovators.  Aghion and Howitt (2006) argue that, given the low rate of entry and turnover in 
many European countries, the Schumpeterian Paradigm can readily explain the productivity gap 
between the U.S. and Europe.  Thus, by showing the strong link between public equity markets, 
innovation and creative destruction, our findings provide micro-level evidence useful for 
understanding the strong connection between financial market development and economic 
growth widely documented at the macro level (e.g., Beck and Levine, 2004). 
Finally, our results suggest that even temporary crashes in stock prices and the associated 
declines in equity availability can have a negative longer-run impact on an economy’s economic 
performance by lowering the intangible investment of public entrants and slowing the process of 
creative destruction.  As noted above, R&D investment by entrants falls sharply in 2001 and 
2002.  In addition, the entry cohorts that span periods dominated by depressed stock prices have 
comparatively little economic impact; in particular, the process of creative destruction stagnates 
during 1975-1979 and 2000-2004.    
7.  Conclusions 
We provide new evidence on the role that public stock markets play in facilitating the 
process of creative destruction.  We explore the importance of new public firms and public 
equity finance for R&D and creative destruction in the U.S. high-tech sector.  Public equity 
finance, largely ignored in the literature, is an increasingly important source of finance in the 
1980s and 1990s and is typically the main form of finance for high-tech entrants early in their 
life-cycle.  Our estimates from a dynamic investment model show that public equity has a 
statistically significant and economically important impact on entrant R&D.  In contrast, no such 
relationship exists for established entrants and incumbents, who arguably are not equity-
dependent.  Additional evidence on the causal link between public equity finance and entrant 
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R&D emerges from the recent bubble in the Nasdaq that generated enormous variation in stock 
issues.  We find that only equity-dependent entrants experience a boom and bust in R&D 
investment during the 1998-2002 period.  Together, these results suggest that shifts in the 
availability of public equity finance have a substantial impact on the R&D of new public 
entrants.  
Our study also documents a dramatic episode of creative destruction in the high-tech 
sector.  In all industries but drugs, the flood of new entrants causes incumbents to lose most of 
their pre-1970 share of sales and R&D, with the largest losses coming in the 1990s.  Descriptive 
regressions show that the evolution of cohort shares of sales and R&D are closely tied to new 
equity finance but not to other forms of finance.  In addition, a substantial number of individual 
new public firms rapidly became leading firms in their respective industries.  While our study 
provides an impressive example of creative destruction, there are important differences from 
Schumpeter’s (1942) description:  new public firms, relying heavily on external public equity, 
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IPOs in high-tech manufacturing industries:  1970 – 2004. 
 
# of Firms at 

























industry code           
           
SIC 283 35 11 3 44 55 136 122 94 465 446 
SIC 357 42 41 16 106 77 78 81 20 419 219 
SIC 366 32 27 6 51 33 44 63 28 252 204 
SIC 367 63 21 3 40 35 51 67 52 269 230 
SIC 382 59 18 4 46 27 26 43 25 189 171 
SIC 384 23 14 10 68 45 73 85 42 337 262 
            
Total 254 132 42 355 272 408 461 261 1931 1532 
            
High-tech 
share of all 
manufacturing 0.14 0.27 0.54 0.62 0.47 0.51 0.59 0.75 0.54 0.48 
           
The table reports the number of existing and IPO firms in high-tech manufacturing during 1970-2004.  The high-
tech industries are pharmaceuticals (SIC 283), office and computing equipment (SIC 357), communications 
equipment (SIC 366), electronic components (SIC 367), industrial measuring and control instruments (SIC 382), and 












Investment and financing after the IPO for newly public high-tech firms. 
 IPO entry cohort 














       
cumulative R&D / initial assets       
median 0.23 0.27 0.48 0.48 1.01 0.89 
mean 0.39 0.41 0.71 0.72 1.59 1.73 
cumulative physical investment / initial assets       
median 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.21 0.25 0.17 
mean 0.59 0.47 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.40 
cumulative total investment / initial assets       
median 0.53 0.56 0.83 0.73 1.33 1.13 
mean 1.00 0.87 1.17 1.09 2.04 2.16 
cumulative new total debt (net) / initial assets       
median 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 
mean 0.37 0.18 0.23 0.10 0.32 0.27 
cumulative gross cash flow / initial assets       
median 0.46 0.68 0.54 0.64 0.28 0.28 
mean 0.68 0.91 0.70 0.73 0.38 0.16 
cumulative new stock issues (net) / initial assets       
median 0.05 0.14 0.23 0.09 0.86 0.47 
mean 0.64 0.40 0.76 0.59 1.82 1.98 
       
Share of observations with negative gross cash flow 0.11 0.05 0.23 0.20 0.41 0.38 
Share of observations with positive dividends 0.20 0.28 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.04 
     
The table reports cumulative investment and financing activity for surviving high-tech IPOs in the first two five-year 
intervals following the IPO.  The year in which the firm conducts its IPO is t = 0.  Investment and financing values 
are summed over each of the five-year intervals (t=1 to t=5 and t=6 to t=10) and then scaled by the book value of 
assets at the start of the interval (i.e., the end of t=0 for the first interval and the end of t=5 for the second interval).  































Dependent variable: (RD/TA)t 
(RD/TA)t-1 0.973*** 1.025*** 0.781*** 1.227*** 1.078*** 1.057*** 1.097*** 
 (0.258) (0.280) (0.088) (0.373) (0.212) (0.342) (0.409) 
(RD/TA)t-1
2 -0.499*** -0.969 -0.326 -0.862 -0.518*** -0.558*** -0.559** 
 (0.150) (0.852) (0.380) (0.869) (0.145) (0.202) (0.256) 
(B/TA)t-1
2 -0.069 -0.030 -0.028 -0.042 -0.393** -0.109 -0.101 
 (0.127) (0.028) (0.024) (0.097) (0.197) (0.166) (0.186) 
(SALES/TA)t -0.014 0.034 0.030* -0.013 0.095* -0.091 -0.004 
 (0.045) (0.032) (0.018) (0.037) (0.052) (0.074) (0.100) 
(SALES/TA)t-1 -0.054*** -0.030 -0.031** -0.022 -0.046** -0.049** -0.070* 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.012) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.038) 
(GCF/TA)t -0.004 0.032 0.046 0.067 -0.142 0.146 -0.037 
 (0.101) (0.068) (0.060) (0.072) (0.133) (0.140) (0.190) 
(GCF/TA)t-1 0.046 -0.001 0.022 0.016 0.009 0.039 0.100* 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.029) (0.037) (0.041) (0.036) (0.060) 
(STK/TA)t 0.229*** -0.021 -0.056 0.080 0.115*** 0.263*** 0.269*** 
 (0.063) (0.053) (0.058) (0.076) (0.029) (0.088) (0.074) 
(STK/TA)t-1 -0.027*** -0.002 0.010 -0.009 -0.030*** -0.029** -0.034* 
 (0.011) (0.036) (0.010) (0.025) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) 
        
M1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
M2 (p-value) 0.295 0.419 0.178 0.188 0.183 0.635 0.714 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
0.865 0.574 1.000 1.000 0.860 0.865 0.913 
Diff-Hansen 
(p-value) 
0.926 0.201 1.000 1.000 0.627 0.943 0.724 
GCF Chi2  
(p-value) 
0.644 0.509 0.060 0.226 0.254 0.167 0.698 
STK Chi2  
(p-value) 
0.004 0.665 0.402 0.469 0.005 0.016 0.003 
Observations 10741 1087 3363 1194 4726 4821 2844 
Firms 1509 226 206 124 516 869 938 
 
Estimation is with systems GMM using lagged levels dated t-2 through t-4 as instruments for the equation in differences and 
lagged differences dated t-1 for the equation in levels.  Fixed firm and industry-specific time effects are included in all 
regressions.  Public entrants are considered “new” for the first fifteen years following the IPO and “established” thereafter.  
Outliers in first-differences are trimmed at the 1% level.  Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and with-in firm serial 
correlation are reported in parenthesis.  GCF Chi2 and STK Chi2 are chi-squared tests that the sum of the cash flow and 





Median R&D-to-sales ratios for IPO cohorts and incumbents over time. 
 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Panel A:  Five high-tech industries  
IPO cohort         
1970 – 1974 0.059 0.059 0.085 0.086 0.095 0.101 0.091 
1975 – 1979  0.065 0.099 0.083 0.091 0.085 0.080 
1980 – 1984   0.093 0.081 0.076 0.097 0.089 
1985 – 1989    0.096 0.087 0.107 0.126 
1990 – 1994     0.121 0.131 0.124 
1995 – 1999      0.180 0.166 
2000 – 2004       0.168 
Incumbents 0.033 0.037 0.055 0.051 0.053 0.062 0.055 
         
 Panel B:  Drugs (SIC 283) 
 IPO cohort         
1970 – 1974        
1975 – 1979        
1980 – 1984   0.284 0.347 0.226 0.175 0.195 
1985 – 1989    0.916 1.125 0.626 0.856 
1990 – 1994     1.682 1.239 1.182 
1995 – 1999      1.756 2.242 
2000 – 2004       2.758 
Incumbents 0.043 0.048 0.074 0.089 0.094 0.104 0.142 
        
The table reports the median R&D-to-sales ratio for IPO cohorts and incumbents in selected years.  The five high-
tech industries in Panel A are from three-digit SIC industries 357, 366, 367, 382 and 384.  Incumbents are firms 
with coverage in Compustat at the beginning of 1970.  No ratios are reported for the first two cohorts in Panel B 












Share of sales accounted for by IPO cohorts over time. 
 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Panel A:  Five high-tech industries 
IPO cohort         
1970 – 1974 0.029 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.073 0.078 0.079 
1975 – 1979  0.015 0.022 0.025 0.018 0.009 0.013 
1980 – 1984   0.072 0.096 0.140 0.118 0.036 
1985 – 1989    0.054 0.079 0.131 0.144 
1990 – 1994     0.078 0.097 0.118 
1995 – 1999      0.053 0.066 
2000 – 2004       0.031 
Incumbents 0.941 0.913 0.820 0.733 0.571 0.386 0.433 
Others 0.030 0.037 0.049 0.052 0.042 0.129 0.080 
         
Panel B:  Drugs (SIC 283) 
IPO cohort        
1970 – 1974 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.024 0.016 
1975 – 1979  0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
1980 – 1984   0.010 0.021 0.036 0.046 0.070 
1985 – 1989    0.004 0.004 0.009 0.014 
1990 – 1994     0.024 0.024 0.041 
1995 – 1999      0.018 0.020 
2000 – 2004       0.026 
Incumbents 0.967 0.978 0.946 0.944 0.884 0.849 0.778 
Others 0.023 0.008 0.028 0.015 0.035 0.027 0.034 
        
The table reports the share of total sales accounted for by IPOs, incumbents and other firms in selected years.  The 
five high-tech industries in Panel A are from three-digit SIC industries 357, 366, 367, 382 and 384.  Incumbents are 
firms with coverage in Compustat at the beginning of 1970.  Others are newly listed firms in Compustat not 












Share of R&D accounted for by IPO cohorts over time. 
 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Panel A:  Five high-tech industries 
IPO cohort         
1970 – 1974 0.037 0.055 0.062 0.058 0.083 0.097 0.121 
1975 – 1979  0.026 0.035 0.043 0.028 0.008 0.014 
1980 – 1984   0.080 0.100 0.118 0.084 0.053 
1985 – 1989    0.067 0.087 0.087 0.098 
1990 – 1994     0.098 0.143 0.137 
1995 – 1999      0.099 0.091 
2000 – 2004       0.055 
Incumbents 0.936 0.881 0.781 0.695 0.551 0.320 0.331 
Others 0.027 0.037 0.043 0.036 0.036 0.162 0.099 
         
Panel B:  Drugs (SIC 283) 
IPO cohort        
1970 – 1974 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.007 
1975 – 1979  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1980 – 1984   0.030 0.057 0.091 0.074 0.095 
1985 – 1989    0.032 0.030 0.019 0.028 
1990 – 1994     0.083 0.070 0.089 
1995 – 1999      0.094 0.055 
2000 – 2004       0.061 
Incumbents 0.967 0.988 0.934 0.887 0.761 0.695 0.640 
Others 0.021 0.005 0.029 0.013 0.023 0.036 0.025 
        
The table reports the share of total R&D spending accounted for by IPOs, incumbents and other firms in selected 
years.  The five high-tech industries in Panel A are from three-digit SIC industries 357, 366, 367, 382 and 384.  
Incumbents are firms with coverage in Compustat at the beginning of 1970.  Others are newly listed firms in 








Sources of finance and the impact of public entrants:  OLS regression estimates. 
 Dependent Variable 
 Change in share of salest,t-1 Change in share of R&Dt,t-1 
Panel A:  Cohort level 
Cohort funds from cash flowt,t-1 -0.012 -0.005 
 (0.029) (0.026) 
Cohort funds from stock issuest,t-1 0.278* 0.543*** 
 (0.143) (0.130) 
Cohort funds from debt issuest,t-1 -0.056 -0.526 
 (0.341) (0.309) 





2 0.12 0.40 
   
Panel B:  Firm level 
Firm funds from cash flowt,t-1 0.020*** 0.032*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm funds from stock issuest,t-1 0.376*** 0.557*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) 
Firm funds from debt issuest,t-1 0.160*** -0.026 
 (0.032) (0.033) 





2 0.25 0.38 
   
The dependent variables are measured as the change in cohort (Panel A) or firm (Panel B) share of sales and R&D 
between the years reported in Tables 5 and 6 (i.e., 1975, 1980…2004).  The independent variables are the cumulative 
flows of finance raised by the cohort (Panel A) or firm (Panel B) over the corresponding five-year interval.  The sample is 








Leading firms in selected industries in 2000. 
Company IPO Year Segment 
Sales 
Venture Capital IPO Proceeds New Equity Finance 
(Post-IPO) 
Panel A:  Office and computing equipment (SIC 357) 
Hewlett-Packard Incumbent 41,165.00   1,025.04 
IBM Incumbent 37,811.00   4,623.88 
Compaq 1983 35,038.00 18.98 102.43 1,164.51 
Dell 1988 31,888.00 32.47 39.71 403.65 
Cisco 1990 18,928.00 21.10 62.28 2,817.89 
Xerox Incumbent 17,156.00   2,316.36 
Sun Microsystems 1986 11,971.00 56.29 90.84 638.57 
Gateway 1993 9,600.60  148.66 150.71 
EMC 1986 8,872.82 0.44 58.62 654.10 
Apple 1980 7,983.00 18.17 189.65 34.78 
       
Panel B:  Electronic components (SIC 367) 
Intel 1971 27,297.00 26.77 28.72 1,234.23 
Solectron 1989 14,137.50 11.25 14.25 1,607.86 
Texas Instruments Incumbent 10,267.00   1,708.14 
SCI Systems Incumbent 8,342.58   114.29 
Motorola Incumbent 7,876.00   4,045.92 
Lucent Technologies Spinoff 6,953.00   3,057.04 
Micron Technology 1984 6,278.40 12.42 43.99 1,300.48 
Advanced Micro Devices 1972 4,644.19 6.70 32.25 1,208.53 
Sanmina 1993 3,911.56 13.59 26.14 687.64 
Jabil Circuit 1993 3,558.32  19.89 803.76 
            
      
All values are in millions of 2000 dollars. The level of segment sales in 2000 is from Compustat's line of business 
data.  The amount of venture capital received is from Venture Economics.  IPO proceeds are taken from the SDC 
New Issues database.  Post-IPO new equity finance is from Compustat, where new equity finance is the sum of net 
equity issues until the firm becomes a net buyer of its equity (see the discussion in section 5.4).  Compaq merged 
with Hewlett-Packard in 2002 and SCI Systems merged with Sanmina in 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
